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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, arbitration has become an increasingly used form of
alternative dispute resolution employed to adjudicate matters between
disputing parties outside of a traditional courtroom setting. In
arbitration, parties who have contracted to arbitrate submit their disputes
to a neutral decision-maker rather than subjecting their claims to judicial
resolution.' Arbitration is often favored over traditional litigation for
many reasons, including the less formal atmosphere, the possibility of
avoiding delay, lower expense, and relieving congested dockets in
courts.2
Although there is a strong public policy favoring arbitration and
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,3 sometimes a party to a purported
arbitration agreement believes the agreement does not cover a particular
dispute, or that there was no agreement to arbitrate at all.4 That party
may sue in court for relief on the underlying dispute. The other party, if
it prefers to arbitrate rather than litigate, typically will file a motion to
stay or dismiss the court action pending arbitration, and courts favor
resolving the issue with deference toward the public policy of enforcing
arbitration, often construing arbitration provisions generously.6 The
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs arbitration agreements
concerning potential disputes grounded in interstate or foreign
commerce.' Section 3 of the FAA directs a court to stay the litigation
1. See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)
(finding that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit"); Gold Coast Mall, Inc.
v. Larmar Corp., 468 A.2d 91, 95 (Md. 1983).
2. See Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361, 365
(Ark. 2000); Anthony v. Kaplan, 918 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Ark. 1996); Birkey Design
Group, Inc. v. Egle Nursing Home, Inc., 687 A.2d 256, 258 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
3. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
4. See Motor City Drive, L.L.C. v. Brennan Beer Gorman Monk Architects and
Interiors, P.L.L.C., 890 A.2d 233 (D.C. 2006).
5. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
6. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983)).
7. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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proceedings if it determines that the parties have agreed to arbitrate a
8
claim brought before it and that the issue is in fact arbitrable.
Section 3 of the FAA states that upon determining that an issue
before a court falls within an arbitration agreement between the parties,
the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement."9 However, the FAA's use of the phrase "the trial of the
action" has created a split among the federal circuit courts.10 When an
order to arbitrate has been issued for all claims brought before a court,
courts are split on whether the filed action should be dismissed or stayed
pending the outcome of the arbitration."
One group of courts adopted the "Must Stay Approach," holding
that the litigation must be stayed until the resolution of the arbitrable
claims.12 These courts reason that the language of the FAA, the need for
judicial assistance during arbitration, and the need to avoid immediate
appealability of an order to arbitrate require an issuing judge to retain
jurisdiction over the litigation by issuing a stay.' 3  Another group of
courts has adopted the "May Dismiss Approach."' 4 These courts hold
that the language of the FAA requires that a stay be issued only when
some claims fall outside the arbitration agreement.' 5 If all claims fall
within the arbitration agreement between the two parties, these courts
reason that dismissal may be appropriate.16
The issue has arisen in courts again and again, and arises quite
often.'7 However, very little has been written on the subject; the most
detailed analysis of the subject is found in a student Note published in
2005.18 The author of that Note concluded that courts should always stay
a case pending arbitration.' 9
8. Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cir. 2000).
9. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
10. See infra Part III.
11. Compare Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Trooicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707
(4th Cir. 2001), and Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992),
and Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988), with Lloyd v.
Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004), and Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird
Corp., 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 1994).
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. Westlaw search using terms "arbitration & stay /s dismiss" in District Court
cases.
18. See Angelina M. Petti, Note, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements:
The Stay-Dismissal Dichotomy ofFAA Section 3, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 565 (2005).
19. See id. at 592-93.
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This article, conversely, argues that courts should stay a case only
when some points of dispute between the parties fall outside the
arbitration agreement and cannot be resolved by the arbitrator. If all
issues between the parties fall within the arbitration provision, the court
should, in its discretion, dismiss the action and leave the parties to the
decision of the arbitrator, pursuant to the parties' contractual agreement.
Part II of this paper will address the background surrounding both
arbitration and the FAA, including a history of the Supreme Court's
expansion of arbitrable claims, which now encompasses almost any
claim that may be brought.20 Part III will focus on the circuit split:
circuits holding that the courts should stay the litigation and circuits
holding that the courts should dismiss the litigation, and their respective
arguments for their positions.21 Part IV will discuss why dismissal
should be allowed when all claims are arbitrable. 22
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Arbitration Act Section 3
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act 23 to govern
24arbitration for conflicts in interstate or foreign commerce. In Section 3
of the FAA, Congress demonstrated its confidence in the arbitral process
and presented direction for courts when compelling arbitration. 2 5 Section
3 of the FAA states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding
is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.26
In this section, Congress directs courts to order arbitration when
arbitration is proper.27 Section 3 includes no exception to this rule, and
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
24. Id. at § 2.
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Congress gives courts authority to review only the applicability of the
arbitration provision itself.2 8
However, it is important to note that the FAA directs courts to stay
the action only when there will be a "trial of the action." 29 The statutory
language fails to consider what courts should do if all claims are
submitted to arbitration and there can be no future "trial of the action." 30
There is no clear prohibition in the FAA against dismissing claims when
there is nothing left for the court to consider, e.g., when there is nothing
left to make a "trial of the action." 3 1
Although the FAA governs arbitration arising under interstate or
foreign commerce, 3 2 arbitration agreements have also been found valid
under common law principles. The Supreme Court of the United States
has, in the past twenty-five years, been extraordinarily deferential toward
the arbitral forum. As the Supreme Court shifted its position on the
arbitrability of statutory claims, it showed a growing trust and reliance in
arbitration.34 The Court's growing reliance in the arbitral process is
telling. It demonstrates a trend toward a more independent forum in
arbitration. In following this trend, some courts have adopted a stance
35
favoring more limited judicial supervision and review.
B. Supreme Court Cases Construing Arbitration and Arbitrable
Claims
The Supreme Court of the United States has long favored arbitration
for limited subjects, but has only recently begun increasing the range of
claims that are considered arbitrable. 3 6  Although arbitration is now
highly favored by the Court, in 1953 the Court decided in Wilko v. Swan
that claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933 were non-
arbitrable." Wilko sued the partners of a securities brokerage firm
(Swan, d/b/a Hayden, Stone & Co.) under the Securities Act, alleging
28. See id.
29. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See id at §§ 1-2.
33. See Murray v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 460 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. App. 1970).
34. Compare Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
35. See infra Part IV.B.
36. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (stating its policy of
interpreting the FAA in favor of a "national policy favoring arbitration"); 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1458 (2009) (holding that "a collective-bargaining
agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA
claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law").
37. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
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that he was induced to purchase stock by the firm's partners' false
representations, resulting in his financial loss.38 Swan filed a motion to
stay the trial until after arbitration, claiming that Wilko had signed an
agreement containing a provision subjecting claims to arbitration. 39 In
denying the stay, the district court held that the arbitration agreement
"deprived [Wilko] of the advantageous court remedy afforded by the
Securities Act." 4 0 Swan petitioned the Supreme Court, raising the issue
of whether the agreement to arbitrate a future claim arising from the
Securities Act was void.41
The Court stated that the Securities Act created a special right to
recover for plaintiffs which was enforceable "in any court of competent
jurisdiction." 42 The Court conceded that arbitration was desirable for
avoiding the delay and expense of traditional litigation and that Congress
favors arbitration for claims based on statutes.4 3 However, the Court
concluded that arbitration in this instance would not adequately protect
the buyers of securities.4 4 Although Swan conceded that arbitration, as a
"form of trial," would not relieve the sellers of their responsibilities and
liabilities found within the Securities Act,4 5 the Court, however, found
that "[e]ven though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to
the buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in
arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings." 46 Citing the need for
subjective findings of the applicability of the Act and the limited nature
of review from arbitration, the Court concluded that the intentions of
Congress in the Securities Act were better protected by allowing such
claims to remain in the judicial forum.47 Therefore, the Court held that
the federal securities claim invalidated the arbitration agreement.48
The Court began its shift toward a more comprehensive view of
arbitrable claims in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.49 There, Byrd
invested $160,000 in securities through a securities broker-dealer, Dean
Witter Reynolds.5 0 After the value of Byrd's stocks declined by over
$100,000, he sued, alleging violations of provisions of the Securities
38. Id. at 428-29.
39. Id. at 429.
40. Id. at 430.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 431.
43. Id. at 431-32.
44. Id. at 435-38.
45. Id. at 433.
46. Id. at 435.
47. Id. at 435-36, 438.
48. Id. at 438.
49. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
50. Id. at 214.
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Exchange Act of 1934.51 Dean Witter moved to sever the state claims
from the federal securities claims, and to compel arbitration of the state
claims pursuant to a Customer's Agreement arbitration provision signed
by Byrd.52 Dean Witter did not attempt to compel arbitration of the
federal securities claim, assuming that it was not subject to arbitration.
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed a circuit split
regarding whether a court could refuse to order arbitration of state claims
that were dependent on the federal securities claims and order all claims
to remain in the court.5 4 The Ninth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits had
relied on "the doctrine of intertwining," holding that "[w]hen arbitrable
and nonarbitrable claims arise out of the same transaction, and are
sufficiently intertwined factually and legally, the district court, under this
view, may in its discretion deny arbitration as to the arbitrable claims and
try all the claims together in federal court."55 These courts cited among
their justifications for application of this rule the need for efficiency and
for courts to preserve their exclusive federal jurisdiction. 6 However, the
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had concluded that under the
Arbitration Act, district courts have no discretion to deny arbitration and
instead must compel arbitration, even in cases which contain both
arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims. The Supreme Court sided with the
latter position, holding that an agreement to arbitrate must be enforced,
regardless of its relation to nonarbitrable claims or the inefficiency
created by resolving the issues separately.58
The Court further expanded the reach of arbitration agreements in
Mitsubishi Motor Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
Mitsubishi, in a joint venture with Chrysler International, S.A.,
contracted with Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, an automobile dealership
located in Puerto Rico, to provide Soler with automobiles for sale.60
Soler's initial business proved so successful that, by the terms of the
agreement between the parties, Soler's minimum sales volume
significantly increased for the 1981 year.6 1 Unable to sell the increased
number of automobiles, Soler requested that Mitsubishi delay or cancel
51. Id.
52. Id. at 215.
53. Id
54. Id at 214.
55. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 216-17.
56. Id at 217.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
60. Id. at 616-17.
61. Id. at 617.
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remaining shipments of automobiles to Puerto Rico.62  Soler also
attempted to transfer some of the shipments it had already received to
63locations within the continental United States and Latin America.
However, Mitsubishi refused to allow the transfer of the automobiles to
the other locations for several reasons, including the absence of heaters
and defoggers in the automobiles, not necessary in Puerto Rico but
required elsewhere.6 4 Eventually Mitsubishi withheld shipment of some
966 automobiles and sued Soler requesting an order to compel
arbitration, pursuant to its Distributor Agreement and Sales Procedure
65
Agreement. Soler counterclaimed, asserting breaches of the Sales
Agreement and violations of the Sherman Act, among other claims.66
The district court ordered arbitration, and the First Circuit affirmed.67
Upon the Supreme Court's granting of certiorari, Soler argued that
its claims were not arbitrable and that arbitration could not be compelled
for statutory claims not specifically named within the agreement to
arbitrate. 6 8 The Court disagreed, stating that there was no prohibition
against arbitrating statutory claims. 69  With regard to the Federal
Arbitration Act, the Court said that the primary goal of passing the Act
was "'to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered,' a
concern which 'requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate."' 70 Focusing on the policy of resolving issues in favor of
arbitration and on the intentions of the parties in drafting arbitration
agreements, the Court stated that no different outcome should result
when parties to an arbitration agreement raise statutory claims.7 ' The
Court cited Wilko v. Swan, highlighting its desire in Wilko that arbitration
would one day encompass claims based in statutes, concluding that "we
are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the
development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution."72 The Court found that absent such contractual defenses as
fraud or compulsion, statutory claims are arbitrable. 73
62. Id.
63. Id. at 617-18.
64. Id. at 618, 620.
65. Id at 618-19.
66. Id at 619-20.
67. Id. at 620-21.
68. Id. at 624-25.
69. Id at 625.
70. Id at 625-26 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221
(1985)).
71. Id at 626.
72. Id at 626-27; see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953).
73. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627.
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Although the general presumption is that statutory claims are
arbitrable, the Court did recognize situations in which statutory claims
should not be subjected to the arbitration forum.74 However, in those
instances, congressional intent to preclude arbitration of the claims must
be found in the statute itself.75 The Court found that parties do not forgo
substantive rights provided by statute by agreeing to arbitrate.76 Rather,
those rights are merely submitted to a different forum.77 Therefore, in
Mitsubishi the Court established the presumption that statutory claims,
absent congressional instruction to the contrary, are arbitrable.
The Supreme Court has shown a strong move toward favoring
arbitration, and Section 3 of the FAA demonstrates Congress's policy
paralleling that of the Supreme Court. 79 Thus, courts should read the
language of the FAA with the same policy of liberal interpretation that
the Court has afforded to arbitration in other contexts, such as the
increasing arbitrability of claims.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT
When ordering a motion to compel arbitration, courts have split
regarding whether the pending litigation should be stayed or dismissed.o
One group of courts, those favoring the "Must Stay Approach," holds
that it is proper for the issuing court to retain jurisdiction of the case by
issuing a stay.' A second group of courts, proponents of the "May
Dismiss Approach," hold that after ordering arbitration, it is proper for a
court to dismiss the case if it finds that all issues before it are arbitrable.82
Placing these two approaches side by side highlights the differences in
arguments set forth by proponents of each: the "Must Stay Approach"
focuses mostly on interpreting the language of the FAA and the
traditional judicial role in dispute resolution, while the "May Dismiss
Approach" focuses mostly on the underlying policies set forth by the




77. Id. at 628.
78. Id. at 627-28.
79. See supra Part II.B.
80. As a preliminary note, it is important to note that none of the circuits favoring
the dismissal approach hold that dismissal is mandatory. As discussed later, these courts
merely hold that dismissal is proper within the discretion of the judge. See, e.g., Choice
Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2001).
81. See infra Part III.A.
82. See infra Part Ill.B.
83. Compare Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004) (focusing on the
language of the FAA and the traditional role of the judiciary in dispute resolution), with
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A. The "Must Stay Approach"
Among the stay-dismiss split, one group of courts holds that the
proper action for a court is to stay the case until after resolution of the
arbitration. 8 4 Several Circuits, including the Third and Tenth, hold that
when parties are ordered to arbitrate, the ordering court must stay the
pending litigation until the arbitration is resolved.
For example, in Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, the Third Circuit held that
it was reversible error for the trial court to dismiss rather than stay." For
over twelve years, Bruno Lloyd worked as an employee with various
contractors at the Hovensa refinery in St. Croix, Virgin Islands. 87 In
2001, while Jacobs/IMC was the contractor for maintenance, Hovensa
awarded a new contract directing that Wyatt take over the contracting
work then performed by Jacobs/IMC.8 8 Jacobs/IMC informed Lloyd that
when its contract expired at the end of the 2001 year, Lloyd would be
laid off.89 When Wyatt took over the contracting work, it filled upper
management positions with employees of its parent corporation, whom
Lloyd claimed were predominantly white.90 In the beginning of 2002,
Wyatt began accepting applications for employment from people in the
Virgin Islands, a condition of which was signing a Dispute Resolution
Agreement (DRA) which provided that any dispute arising between the
applicant and Wyatt in any way related to the application, terms and
conditions of employment, or any final employment relationship would
be submitted to final and binding arbitration. 91 When Wyatt denied
Lloyd's reapplication, Lloyd filed suit against both Wyatt and Hovensa
in the district court, alleging violations of the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1964, violation of provisions of the Virgin Islands Code, wrongful
discharge, breach of implied contract of good faith and fair dealing, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.9 2
In response to Lloyd's motion, Wyatt filed a motion requesting the
court to compel arbitration as provided by the DRA. 9 3 The district court
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992) (focusing on the
policy considerations favoring dispute resolution).
84. See Petti, supra note 18, for a discussion of the opinions of these circuits.
85. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 263; Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953
(10th Cir. 1994).
86. See Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 263.





92. Id. at 266-67.
93. Id. at 267.
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granted Wyatt's motion, dismissing the complaint with prejudice. 9 4
Finding that all claims were arbitrable, the district court reasoned that no
claims were left for its adjudication, and thus retaining the case was
unnecessary.9 5
On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court should
have stayed the litigation rather than dismissed it, and gave three reasons
for its holding.96 First, it stated that the plain language of the FAA's text
mandated that courts are to stay the litigation during arbitration: "the
court . .. shall on the application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement." 97 The court found that by stating that the court "shall"
stay the litigation, the FAA precluded dismissal.98 Further, the court
stated that it is permissible to disregard direct language of Congress only
when adhering to the actual language would produce a result that clearly
was not within Congress's intent, and that such an exception did not
apply to the FAA. 99
The second reason proffered by the court of appeals for staying the
litigation focused on the trial court's assistance during the arbitration
process. 00 It stated that the district court plays an important role in
arbitration proceedings under the FAA, even when all claims are found
to be arbitrable.' 0 According to the court, parties are permitted to return
to the court to resolve disputes about such issues as selecting the
arbitrator, seeking court assistance in compelling a witness or punishing
for contempt, or enforcement of the arbitrator's final decision.102
Otherwise, it stated, the parties would be required to file a new action
each time such an issue arises. 10 3
Third, the court of appeals stated that an issue of appealability may
arise if the case is dismissed rather than stayed.10 4  It reasoned that
"[u]nder § 16 of the FAA, whenever a stay is entered under § 3, the party
resisting arbitration is expressly denied the right to an immediate
appeal." 0 5 On the other hand, if the court were to dismiss the action, the
94. Id.
95. Id
96. Id. at 268-71.
97. Id at 269 (citing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006)).
98. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 269 ("The directive that the Court 'shall' enter a stay simply
cannot be read to say that the Court shall enter a stay in all cases except those in which all
claims are arbitrable and the Court finds dismissal to be the preferable approach.").
99. Id. at 269-70.





105. Id. (citation omitted).
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parties could take an immediate appeal from the district court's order,
delaying the commencement of arbitration proceedings.' 06  The court
reasoned that, if an exception to the order to stay the case is found, then
the district court is empowered with the ability to confer a new right of
immediate appeal, whereas under § 16 of the FAA, interlocutory appeals
are not permitted from an order granting a stay. 07
In sum, the Third and Tenth Circuits hold that upon ordering
arbitration, the only permissible action for a court to take is to retain
jurisdiction of the case by issuing a stay.'08 Angelina Petti made the
same arguments in a 1995 Note.' 09 Relying on an interpretation of the
FAA Section 3 and adhering to the traditional role of a judge in
adjudicating disputes between parties, these courts and Petti find no
support for allowing a judge the discretion to dismiss the case when all
claims are subject to arbitration. 0
B. The "May Dismiss Approach"
Other Circuits, such as the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth, take the
opposite approach and hold that upon ordering arbitration, the court may
dismiss the case before it if all claims are arbitrable."' While these
courts would permit dismissal, no court has mandated it, instead
concluding that dismissal is discretionary."12
In Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal after ordering arbitration, finding that such
action fell within the discretion of the court."'3 Joan Chason Alford sued
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., alleging employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII.114  Dean Witter moved to compel arbitration,
claiming that Alford agreed to arbitrate when she signed the broker
registration agreements with the New York Stock Exchange and the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc." 5 The district court and
the court of appeals both refused to compel arbitration until after the
106. See id at 270 n.8.
107. Id. at 270 n.8, 271.
108. Id. at 263; Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cir.
1994).
109. See Petti, supra note 18.
110. See Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 263; Adair Bus Sales, 25 F.3d at 953; Petti, supra note 18.
111. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707 (4th Cir.
2001); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992); Sparling v.
Hoffman Constr. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988).
112. See generally Choice Hotels, 252 F.3d at 707; Alford, 975 F.2d at 1161;
Sparling, 864 F.2d at 635.
113. Alford, 975 F.2d at 1162, 1164.
114. Id. at 1162.
115. Id.
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Supreme Court handed down its decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.'16  In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that although
arbitration agreements signed by employees are binding contracts only
between those employees and the securities exchanges, age
discrimination claims are arbitrable." 7
After the decision in Gilmer, the Fifth Circuit vacated its decision
and remanded Alford's claim." 8 The district court then granted Dean
Witter's Motions to Dismiss and to Compel Arbitration.'19
Subsequently, Alford appealed back to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the
district court erred in dismissing her claim in violation of the explicit
language of Section 3 of the FAA.12 0 In its opinion, the court of appeals
stated that Section 3 mandates a stay "upon a showing that the opposing
party has commenced suit 'upon any issue referable to arbitration under
an agreement in writing for such arbitration. . .. "21 The court,
however, found the language of the FAA to mandate the court to stay the
action only when some of the claims posed in the complaint are
arbitrable.12 2 When all claims are subject to an arbitration agreement, the
court found that a different outcome may result: "[t]he weight of
authority clearly supports dismissal of the case when all of the issues
raised in the district court must be submitted to arbitration."'12 3 The court
reasoned that if all issues fell under the arbitration agreement, then
retaining jurisdiction served no further purpose.124 It stated that any
remedies requested by the parties or ordered by the arbitrator after
completion of arbitration would not require renewed consideration of the
merits of the case, but rather would entail a limited review of the
arbitrator's award as a matter of law.125 Finding that all of Alford's
claims were arbitrable, the court concluded that dismissal was a
permissible action for the district court to take.' 26
The Fourth Circuit has likewise found that dismissal may be proper
when all claims fall under a valid agreement to arbitrate.127 In Choice
Hotels International, Incorporated v. BSR Tropicana Resort,
Incorporated, the court of appeals stated that the FAA requires judges to
116. Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
117. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20, n.2.
118. Alford, 975 F.2d at 1163.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1164.
121. Id
122. Id.
123. Id. (emphasis in original).
124. Alford, 975 F.2d at 1164.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707 (4th Cir.
2001).
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stay the pending. case involving issues covered by written arbitration
agreements, but that dismissal is proper when all of the issues in dispute
are subject to the arbitration.128 The court found that one of the issues in
dispute fell within the arbitration agreement, but that the other fell
outside its provisions.12 9 While ordering arbitration on the issue that fell
under the arbitration agreement, the court stayed the proceedings related
to the other issue during the pendency of the arbitration.13 0 Although the
court acknowledged that dismissal may be appropriate for the case if all
issues fell within the arbitration agreement, in this case it could not, and
ordered the arbitrable claim to proceed to arbitration while ordering a
stay of the other issue. 1'
The courts that have held dismissal to be proper have found only
that it is a permissible action to be taken at the discretion of the court; no
court has held that dismissal is the required action.13 2 In sum, courts
such as the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have found that dismissal of
the underlying claim may be appropriate if all issues before the court fall
within the provisions of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the decision
to dismiss the case is within the discretion of the court.' 33
IV. ANALYSIS
In light of the Supreme Court's trend of validating and increasing
the scope of arbitration, courts should follow suit and allow parties who
choose arbitration the outcome of that forum. If all of the issues fall
within a valid and binding arbitration agreement, the court should have
discretion to dismiss the case and leave the parties to the arbitral forum.
A. Critique of the "Must Stay Approach"
Courts and commentators favoring the "Must Stay Approach" rely
primarily on three arguments.' 3 4 For example, both the Third Circuit and
Angelina Petti offer the same arguments supporting the view that courts
must stay litigation after ordering arbitration.' 35 First, the Third Circuit
and Petti argue that the text of the FAA includes a direction to stay the
128. Id at 709-10.
129. Id. at 711.
130. Id. at 712.
131. Id at 710, 712.
132. See generally id. at 707; Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161
(5th Cir. 1992); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988).
133. See Choice Hotels, 252 F.3d at 709; Alford, 975 F.2d at 1164; Sparling, 864 F.2d
at 638.
134. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004); Petti, supra note
18.
135. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 269-70; Petti, supra note 18, at 584-92.
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case, and that the statutory text does not include the word "dismiss."1 36
Second, they argue that the assistance of judges may be required during
the arbitration process.13 1 If the case is dismissed, then each time a party
requests the court's assistance in compelling a witness, appointing an
arbitrator, or enforcing an arbitration judgment, it would be required to
file a new action.138  Third, the Third Circuit and Petti argue that
allowing courts to issue stays rather than dismissing the action would
prevent the possibility of immediate appeal.139 Each argument will be
addressed in turn. In sum, courts such as the Third Circuit, and
commentators such as Petti, reason that denying courts the ability to
dismiss the action encourages strict adherence to the carefully drafted
language of the statute, creates efficiency in later requests for court
assistance, and forecloses the possibility of appeal,14 0 thus creating a
more efficient overall process.141
1. The FAA Supports Dismissal
The first argument favoring the "Must Stay Approach" is that the
plain language of the FAA mandates stay rather than dismissal.14 2 The
Third Circuit found that upon a court's decision to order arbitration, the
text of the FAA leaves no discretion to the court to dismiss rather than
stay the litigation proceeding.14 3 The Third Circuit stated that "[t]he
directive that the Court 'shall' enter a stay simply cannot be read to say
that the Court shall enter a stay in all cases except those in which all
claims are arbitrable and the Court finds dismissal to be the preferable
approach." 44 Petti's first argument mirrors that of the court, but focuses
on different language within section 3 of FAA.145  While the Third
Circuit focused on the presence of the word "shall," 4 6 Petti reasons that
the statutory language considers situations in which all claims may be
subject to arbitration, suggesting that "upon any issue referable to
arbitration" encompasses both claims in which some issues are arbitrable
and claims in which all issues are arbitrable.147
136. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 269; Petti, supra note 18, at 584-85.
137. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 270; Petti, supra note 18, at 585-87.
138. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 270; Petti, supra note 18, at 586-88.
139. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 270; Petti, supra note 18, at 589-91.
140. See Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 269-70; Petti, supra note 18, at 584-92.
141. Petti, supra note 18, at 584-92.
142. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 269.
143. Id at 269-70.
144. Id. at 269.
145. See Petti, supra note 18, at 584-85.
146. See Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 269-70.
147. Petti, supra note 18, at 585 (quoting Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3
(2006)).
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These arguments, however, do not take full account of the statutory
language within the FAA. Section 3 of FAA provides that "the court ...
shall on [the] application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. .. .,,148 The Third Circuit focuses only on the four italicized
words, and ignores the rest of the sentence. The word "stay," however,
is qualified by the underlined language that follows it.149 The Third
Circuit fails to recognize that the court is to stay the action only when it
will later conduct a trial on that action.
By failing to recognize the "trial of the action" qualifying language,
the Third Circuit overlooks certain fundamental aspects of arbitration.
Parties who are bound to an arbitration clause have agreed to subject
their claims to a neutral third-party arbitrator rather than a courtroom
judge.15 0  This election to select arbitration as a means of resolution
replaces the parties' rights to judicial recourse; parties may not seek
resolution of the same claim through both arbitration and a court.'5 1 Had
the Third Circuit read the FAA in a light reflecting its underlying policies
and goals, the Third Circuit would have understood that Section 3's
reference to "the trial of the action" cannot relate to those claims already
subjected to arbitration; there can be no "trial of the action" if the claim
is subject, instead, to binding arbitration. If no claim may be tried to the
court, no future trial of the action may occur, and so the provision in the
FAA stating that a stay shall be issued in such situations does not speak
to the full spectrum of possibilities presented to a court which has issued
an order compelling arbitration.
Similarly, Petti overlooks the possibility that section 3 merely
suggests that "any issue referable to arbitration" refers to the statute's
applicability to any claim for which arbitration is permissible: tort
claims, contract claims, or statutory claims.' 5 2 Section 3 of the FAA
simply reinforces the statute's applicability to all arbitrable claims.153
It follows, then, that if all issues between disputing parties fall
within the scope of the arbitration provision, there will be nothing left to
make a "trial of the action" before a court. The FAA's plain language
does not speak to this situation, and thus does not foreclose the
148. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3; see supra Part II.A.
149. See Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 268-70.
150. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581-82 (1960); Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 468 A.2d 91, 95 (Md. 1983).
151. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) ("[I]n enacting § 2 of the
federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.").
152. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3; Petti, supra note 18, at 584-85.
153. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3.
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possibility that a court may choose dismissal.154 The language of the
FAA suggests that in some situations, namely those in which all claims
are not subject to arbitration, the court must take certain action: it must
issue a stay.'55  In situations in which all claims will fall within the
arbitration provision, however, there are no remaining issues for a court
to try, and thus dismissal becomes a permissible option.156
2. Judicial Supervision and Review of Arbitration Decisions is
Inconsistent with the FAA
The Third Circuit in Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC proffered a second
argument: retaining the case by issuance of a stay rather than dismissal
enables the courts to more effectively assist the disputing parties in
arbitration proceedings.'57  However, interim relief orders such as
preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining orders may be issued by
the court before ordering arbitration and dismissing the case;
alternatively, if judicial assistance were required during the arbitration
proceedings, nothing would preclude the parties from filing a separate
action, seeking court assistance in the particular matter. Because the
parties have agreed to arbitration, that forum should remain the primary
setting in which their dispute is resolved.'58 Allowing a court to retain a
case during arbitration may encourage parties to file numerous motions
seeking court assistance, thereby attempting to have a judge rule on
aspects of the parties' dispute rather than an arbitrator.
Additionally, Petti argues that if a party brings suit to enforce an
award granted by an arbitrator, a court may lack subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim despite having jurisdiction before dismissal.' 5 9
The court would retain jurisdiction if it instead issued a stay.160
However, the FAA, while a federal statute, does not itself confer federal
jurisdiction, and so any jurisdiction a court had before ordering
arbitration and dismissing the claim would still be applicable if
subsequent motions were filed.161 Dismissing a case upon ordering
arbitration would not deprive a court of jurisdiction during a subsequent




157. See Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 270 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Petti,
supra note 18, at 585-87 (providing that courts may play important roles during
arbitration in regard to the arbitration process itself).
158. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
159. Petti, supra note 18, at 588-89.
160. Id.
161. Keating, 465 U.S. at 16 n.9.
162. See id.
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dismissing a case, dismissal would not prevent a party from enforcing an
arbitration award. The party seeking to enforce the decision would have
a different court available to it, such as a state court, because the FAA
applies in state courts as well as federal courts.
When the parties have agreed to arbitrate by entering into a valid
and binding arbitration provision, judicial involvement should be
extremely limited.16 3 Had parties desired the traditional courtroom forum
to resolve their disputes, they would not have chosen arbitration as the
governing forum. Because arbitration is selected as the forum for
resolution of parties' disputes, their desires should be effectuated and
arbitration should govern, rather than litigation in a court.1 64
3. Appeal of an Order to Arbitrate Would Not Stand in Contrast
to the Goals of the FAA
The third argument proffered by the Third Circuit in Lloyd v.
Hovensa LLC concerns the appealability of an order to arbitrate that has
been dismissed.16 5 The Third Circuit found that the court should stay the
action rather than dismiss because dismissal would permit the party
opposing the order to arbitrate to appeal the order as a final decision.166
While it is true that an interlocutory appeal may not be taken if the case
is stayed, allowing a party to appeal the order to arbitrate protects that
party's interest in the arbitral forum. When a claim is brought before a
court, appeal is available as a means of ensuring the correct resolution of
its claims or defenses.16 7 This same right should be afforded to those
who have been ordered by a court to resolve their disputes in a different
forum. Just as a district court may incorrectly find in favor of one party
in a civil dispute, it may likewise incorrectly find applicable an
arbitration provision between the parties. Dismissal, as a court's final
decision, will adequately protect the rights of the parties by not
163. See Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 332 N.E.2d 333,
335 (N.Y. 1975) ("[T]he announced policy of this State favors and encourages arbitration
as a means of conserving the time and resources of the courts and the contracting parties.
'One way to encourage the use of the arbitration forum' we recently noted 'would be to
prevent parties to such agreements from using the courts as a vehicle to protract
litigation. This conduct has the effect of frustrating both the initial intent of the parties as
well as legislative policy.' To this end the Legislature has assigned the courts a minimal
role in supervising arbitration practice and procedures.") (citation omitted).
164. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the Supreme Court's trend toward a policy
favoring liberal interpretation of arbitration agreements.
165. Lloyd v. Hovensa, 369 F.3d 263, 270 (3d Cir. 2004); Petti, supra note 18, at 589-
91.
166. Id. See Petti, supra note 18, at 589-91 (stating that the failure of the FAA to
define a "final decision" renders a dismissal pursuant to an order to arbitrate subject to
immediate appeal, contrary to the FAA's goal of ensuring speedy resolution of disputes).
167. See generally FED. R. APP. P.
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subjecting them to the arbitral forum if they should not be bound to do
so.
If appeal is allowed, it would not permanently foreclose the
arbitration. Instead, it would allow the party to challenge the order itself,
and, if the appellate court finds that the order to arbitrate was
appropriate, arbitration will still occur. This argument, raised by the
Third Circuit, seems inconsistent with its other arguments. 16 In a
previous argument against dismissal, the court stressed the need for
judicial supervision of the arbitration process.' 6 9 Now, the court claims
that an appellate court should play no part in the arbitration
determination.170 Had the court formulated a stronger argument against
permitting dismissal, its arguments would have consistently favored the
judicial involvement in the arbitration process. Instead, the court fails to
recognize that its policy should favor a consistent process for the
arbitration forum.
B. Analysis and Proposal of a Uniform Rule Favoring the "May
Dismiss Approach"
While proponents of the "Must Stay Approach" focus mostly on
statutory interpretation and traditional roles of judges, courts reasoning
that dismissal may be permissible if all issues fall under the arbitration
provision rely mostly on the general policy favoring the right to contract
for arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.' 7' By allowing
arbitrators to control the resolution of the parties' disputes, courts such as
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits place the same reliance in the arbitral forum
as the Supreme Court has come to do through cases such as Byrd and
Mitsubishi.172
The Fifth Circuit found in Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. that
once a court compels arbitration, the court serves no further purpose in
the resolution of the dispute.173 That court reasoned that any further
issue that comes before the court which ordered arbitration would consist
of a new claim, and would not be dependent on any consideration of the
merits contained in the dispute between the parties.174  This court
recognized that arbitration, once selected as the dispute forum between
168. See Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 268.
169. Id at 270.
170. Id. at 270 n.8.
171. See Choice Hotels Int'l Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 710
(4th Cir. 2001); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.
1992); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1988).
172. See supra Part II.B.
173. Alford, 975 F.2d at 1164.
174. Id.
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the parties, should be given deference, and court intrusion should remain
minimal. 175
In Choice Hotels International, Incorporated v. BSR Tropicana
Resort, Incorporated, the Fourth Circuit focused on the Supreme Court's
liberal policy favoring arbitration.'76  At two different points in its
opinion, the court cited cases stating explicitly that hypertechnical
interpretation of arbitration provisions should be avoided, finding instead
that giving wide deference to agreements to arbitrate is preferable.177
The case law comprising the background and development of
arbitrable claims sheds some light on the stay-dismiss dispute.'78 As the
Supreme Court began allowing more types of claims to be arbitrable, it
expanded the judicial forum's faith in the efficient and correct outcome
of decisions in a different forum.17 9 As arbitration becomes a more relied
upon setting for dispute resolution, courts should afford the alternative
forum greater latitude and responsibility in its decision-making. Courts
should no longer seek judicial oversight of arbitrators and should leave
the parties to their contractually chosen forum for resolution of disputes.
The language of the FAA does not explicitly or impliedly preclude
dismissal of cases upon issuance of an order to arbitrate; instead, the
language supports dismissal when all claims fall within the arbitration
provisions. 80 Judicial supervision of the arbitral process is unnecessary
and undermines the authority of the arbitrator. Allowing a party to
appeal an order to arbitrate before being relegated to that forum further
protects its rights by ensuring that arbitration is, in fact, the correct
forum. As the Supreme Court places more faith in the arbitration
process, that process should be afforded greater faith by circuit and
district courts throughout the United States.' ' Courts should begin
enforcing a judicial hands-off policy toward arbitration once it has been
determined that arbitration is appropriate. By allowing a judge to
dismiss a case which falls completely within the arbitration agreement,
175. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (stating that the Court's
view is in favor of a strong national policy favoring arbitration); Choice Hotels, 252 F.3d
at 710.
176. Choice Hotels, 252 F.3d at 710.
177. Id. at 710-11 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d
88, 92 (4th Cir. 1996)).
178. See supra Part II.B.
179. Compare Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), with Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
180. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
181. See supra Part II.B.
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the arbitration forum is afforded the power and authority that the parties
to the dispute have chosen to place in it.' 82
In addition to honoring the federal policy favoring arbitration, there
is another strong reason for allowing courts to dismiss a case once it has
found all issues before it subject to a valid arbitration agreement.
Litigation surrounding arbitration proceedings is common." When
parties to arbitration request a court to remain involved in the arbitration
process by issuing motions to compel discovery, for example, the
arbitration process is halted and parties are left "standing with one foot in
the district court and the other in the arbitrator's office."l 84 Doing so
creates a hybrid judicial-arbitral forum, despite the fact that many courts
have found that effective arbitration requires minimal judicial
involvement.'85
Therefore, a more flexible and workable rule is required, honoring
the federal policy in favor of enforcing private agreements to arbitrate. If
all claims or issues in dispute fall under the arbitration agreement, then
that contract should govern all issues between the parties, and the
underlying action ordinarily should be dismissed. However, courts
should have the discretion to stay the underlying action if some issues
fall outside the arbitration agreement or there is some other compelling
reason to stay that particular case rather than to dismiss it. This more
flexible rule protects the parties' interests in their underlying claims
while honoring their contractually chosen forum and the great reliance
the Supreme Court has placed in arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal circuit courts have split regarding whether a judge may
dismiss a case when all issues brought before it by the parties fall within
a valid and binding arbitration agreement.'8 While one group has taken
the approach that the court is required by the language of the FAA to stay
the case pending the outcome of arbitration,187 another group has found
that dismissal is not precluded and that it may be proper in some
instances. 8 8  When juxtaposing the arguments of the two sides of the
split within the context of the FAA and Supreme Court jurisprudence of
182. See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (stating
that parties are only required to arbitrate when they have agreed to do so).
183. See, e.g., Mississippi Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558, 566 (S.D.
Miss. 1976).
184. Id. at 564.
185. See Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 332 N.E.2d 333,
335 (N.Y. 1975).
186. See supra Part III.
187. See supra Part III.A.
188. See supra Part III.B.
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arbitration, it becomes clear that allowing courts the discretion to dismiss
a case when all issues are arbitrable better serves the goals, policies, and
the parties' expectations of arbitration.
Courts that order arbitration should be given discretion to dismiss
claims when all issues are arbitrable, achieving a better and more just
result. By foreclosing the possibility of a court intervening and issuing
orders in matters that are best delegated to the arbitrator, the parties are
required to live up to their contractual promise to arbitrate the issues on
point. However, when issues fall outside the arbitration agreement and
remain within the jurisdiction of the court, the case may be stayed and
the parties are not denied a timely remedy for those issues outside the
scope of the arbitration agreement. This approach provides a bright line
rule, distinguishing between situations in which dismissal is appropriate
and those in which a stay is more proper, focusing upon whether all
issues may be determined in arbitration.
This approach does not require that an issuing judge always dismiss
the action. When some issues between the parties fall outside the scope
of the arbitration agreement, the judge should stay the action. The
arbitrable issues can be resolved quickly and effectively in arbitration,
and the parties may then result to court for a judicial determination of
their remaining issues. This action is supported by the Third Circuit's
opinion in Lloyd v. Hovensa LLC.189 The court's second reason for
holding that a stay is required when arbitration is issued concerned the
need for parties to refile a motion before the court if assistance is
required.190 The concerns of the Third Circuit would be protected,
however, if disputes that only partially fall within an arbitration order are
stayed; once arbitration has concluded, the parties would not need to
refile their claims before the court which issued the stay.
Although it would not be appropriate in all situations for a court to
dismiss the action upon ordering arbitration, it would remain an
appropriate action for a court to take when all issues fall within the
arbitration provision. Permitting dismissal in such situations would
prevent a waste of judicial resources because issues that do not properly
belong before a judge will not remain in the judicial sphere. Should the
Supreme Court attempt to resolve this circuit split, it should do so with
an eye to its clearly established policy favoring the independence of the
arbitral forum.
189. See Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2004).
190. Id. at 270.
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